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IMPLICIT RACIAL ATTITUDES OF DEATH
PENALTY LAWYERS
Theodore Eisenberg*
Sheri Lynn Johnson**
INTRODUCTION
Defense attorneys commonly suspect that the defendant's race
plays a role in prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty, espe-
cially when the victim of the crime was white.' When the defendant is
convicted of the crime and sentenced to death, it is equally common
for such attorneys to question the racial attitudes of the jury. These
suspicions are not merely partisan conjectures; ample historical, 2 sta-
tistical,3 and anecdotal 4 evidence supports the inference that race mat-
ters in capital cases. Even the General Accounting Office of the
United States concludes as much.5 Despite McCleskey v. Kemp,6 in
which the United States Supreme Court concluded that strong, well-
controlled statistical correlations with race do not demonstrate causa-
* Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The authors would like to thank
Mary Mulhearn for her research assistance.
** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. A race-of-victim effect is widely supported by empirical studies. The existence of a broad
race-of-defendant effect has been much more difficult to detect. David Baldus et al., Racial Dis-
crimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview,
with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1658-59 n.61, 1662, app. B
(1998) (collecting studies and reporting that race-of-defendant effect has not been found in over
fifty empirical studies). For recent evidence of such an effect, see John H. Blume et al., Explain-
ing Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 167, 200
(2004).
2. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. See e.g., DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); Baldus et al., supra note 1; SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO,
DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); John H.
Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1771, 1790 (1998); RICHARD C. DIETER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN BLACK AND WHITE:
WHO LIVES, WHO DIES, WHO DECIDES 17 fig. 7 (1998) (summarizing studies).
4. For a particularly egregious example, see Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 920 (1988)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (A juror handed the bailiff a napkin with a drawing of a man on a
gallows above the inscription "Hang the Niggers.").
5. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATT-ERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 1-6 (1990).
6. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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tion, half of all Americans believe that race does influence the admin-
istration of the death penalty. 7
In investigating the influence of racial bias, commentators (our-
selves included) have focused on prosecutors and jurors,8 generally
neglecting the question of whether bias affects the representation de-
fense counsel provides his or her client. In part, this may be due to
the greater difficulty in uncovering evidence of bias in the ranks of
defense counsel; most of the evidence of bias of other death penalty
actors has been uncovered through the efforts of defense counsel, a
class one might suspect would be less likely to scrutinize itself. It may
also be faith in the adversary system that disinclines observers to sus-
pect bias on the part of defense counsel: One would hope that those
who represent capital defendants (or at least African-American capi-
tal defendants) would themselves be free of racialized thinking as they
establish trust with their clients, direct both fact and mitigation inves-
tigations, select experts, choose witnesses to call, and decide what ar-
guments to make. A final reason for this inattention to defense
lawyers may be the apparent sincerity of the ideological commitment
of most such lawyers to racial equality; not only do they proclaim that
commitment, 9 but the poor pay and low status of their work suggests
some amount of sacrifice for those ideological commitments. But ide-
ological commitment need not translate into racially unbiased evalua-
tions, as a large accumulation of literature discussing social and
cognitive psychology demonstrates. 10 Indeed, the defense lawyer's
commitment to the formal norm of equality is probably shared with
most prosecutors and jurors. So the question should be asked, better
late than not at all: What do we know about the capital defense law-
yer's racial attitudes?
Nothing. Virtually nothing is known about the racial attitudes of
lawyers in general, let alone defense lawyers or capital defense law-
7. See Tom Moranthau & Peter Annin, Should McVeigh Die?, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1997, at
20 (citing a Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates polling seventy-
five adults, eighteen and older, June 5-6, 1997 in which 49% of respondents agreed). Non-white
respondents overwhelmingly agreed. Id.
8. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 3; Baldus et al., supra note 1; GROSS & MAURO, supra
note 3; Blume et al., supra note 3; Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspec-
tive: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Toler-
ance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (1994); Stephen B. Bright,
Race, Poverty, the Death Penalty and the Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 1 SEATTLE J.
Soc. JUST. 73 (2002).
10. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1760-66
(1993) (reviewing the literature).
1540 [Vol. 53:1539
IMPLICIT RACIAL ATTITUDES
yers specifically. The demographic characteristics,11 compensation
patterns,12 career paths, 13 and occasionally the daily activities 14 of law-
yers are studied, but researchers to date have expressed little interest
in their attitudes, with the exception of attitudes concerning job
satisfaction.' 5
In contrast, quite a lot is known about the racial attitudes of the
general population. The prevalence of hostile, overt racism has been
declining at least since the 1960s.16 Some researchers have observed
that polls may overstate this trend, given the growing social unac-
ceptability of racial hostility. Indeed, when experiments have tried to
weed out social desirability effects, they do find greater levels of con-
scious stereotyping and hostility, though still clearly lesser levels than
in the past. 17 For the most part, however, old-fashioned, "Bull Con-
nor-style" racism has not been replaced with colorblindness but with
subtler manifestations of racial bias. Some social psychologists have
labeled this newer racism "aversive racis[m]," documenting the preva-
lence of subjects who subscribe to a formal norm of equality, but de-
sire to keep their distance from other racial groups, and often covertly
disparage those groups. 18 Cognitive psychologists have focused more
on stereotypes, observing how thinking and judgment may be altered
by stereotypes that the subject would not endorse, and often con-
sciously rejects.
11. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Studying Gender Bias in the Courts: Stories and Statistics, 45
STAN. L. REV. 2187 (1993); Report of the Working Commission to the Second Circuit Task Force
on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117.
12. See, e.g., Catherine Green Burnett et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified and Effective
Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 595
(2001); Robert R. Rigg, The Constitution, Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study, 27 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 1 (1999).
13. See, e.g., Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It's Hard To Be a Human Being and Law-
yer": Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W.
VA. L. REV. 495 (2003); Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Building Trust: Social Capital, Distributive
Justice and Loyalty to the Firm, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 483 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's
Office, 20 LAW & Soc'v REV. 93 (1986).
15. See, e.g., Granfield & Koenig, supra note 13; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Kaushik
Mukhopadhaya, The Fruits of Our Labors: An Empirical Study of the Distribution of Income
and Job Satisfaction Across the Legal Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342 (1999).
16. See, e.g., HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TREND AND IN-
TERPRETATIONS (1997); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing
Significance of Race, 63 COLO. L. REV. 325 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, a Little Fak-
ing, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 252 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 1016, 1027-28 (1988) (reviewing the literature).
2004] 1541
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Both of these (related) conceptions of modern racism raise the
troubling possibility that defense counsel, who are charged with undi-
vided loyalty to their clients, and presumed to serve as a shield against
racial bias on the part of other criminal justice system actors, may in
fact experience both compromised loyalty and judgment when they
serve African-American or Latino clients. On the other hand, per-
haps capital defense attorneys, either by self-selection or by training,
are different than the rest of the population in this regard. This Arti-
cle describes preliminary data suggesting that they are not. That they
exhibit similar automatic racial attitudes does not, of course, prove
that their performance is impaired by those attitudes; we leave the
implications of our findings for the discussion section.
II. GATHERING THE DATA
A. The Instrument
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) was developed to measure the
relative strength with which groups (or individuals) are associated
with positive and negative evaluations. It has been used to measure
attitudes about a variety of issues, including race, gender, age, and
political candidates, and is accepted as a valid research tool. All varia-
tions of the IAT use some form of response latency to assess those
attitudes that are "automatic," as opposed to attitudes that are subject
to intention or control,19 and operate on the principal that it should
be easier to make the same behavioral response to concepts that are
associated than to concepts that are not associated. Computerized
versions of the IAT achieve these pairings by assigning a keyboard
key to be pressed in response to items from categories such as old or
bad, and another key to be pressed in response to items from the op-
posite categories, such as young or good. Then the pairings are
switched, with the subject being asked to press one key in response to
either old or good, and another key in response to items from either
the young or bad category. The differential speed required to com-
plete these two opposite pairings is measured, yielding information
both about the direction of the implicit attitude and the strength of
the association; thus, if it takes longer for a subject to complete the
pairings of old and good than the pairings of young and good, then the
researcher infers that young is automatically associated with good for
that subject, and old with bad.
19. This is not to say that the subject cannot thwart the accurate measure of these automatic
attitudes, should he or she choose to do so, but only that subjects who faithfully follow the
directions will reflect their unconscious associations, not their conscious preferences.
[Vol. 53:15391542
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More than 500,000 IATs that focus on race have been taken online
using this format. 20 In the race IAT, subjects are first asked to pair
"good" words with pictures of white faces and "bad" words with pic-
tures of black faces, and then to reverse the pairings.21 Here, if the
subject can more quickly complete the task when white and good (and
black and bad) are paired than when black and good (and white and
bad) are paired, it means that the subject automatically pairs white
with good-and black with bad.
A paper and pencil version of the race IAT is also available and was
used in collecting these data because of time and computer accessibil-
ity constraints. In the paper and pencil version, subjects are faced
with a column of words and faces, which he or she is asked to catego-
rize "as quickly as possible without making too many mistakes" in
twenty seconds. First the subjects complete two practice tests; the first
test pairs flowers with good and insects with bad, and the second pairs
insects with good and flowers with bad.22 This practice is designed to
make the subject familiar with the pairing and check-off process, and
accustomed to the idea of switching which items are paired. Then the
subjects are asked to familiarize themselves with four new categories.
One category is "good," which is composed of the words flower,
pretty, and love; a second category is "bad," composed of the words
ugly, vomit, and hate; the third category is "white," which is composed
of five white faces; and the fourth category is "black," which is com-
posed of five black faces. A short column of these words and pictures
appears, and the subjects are instructed to go down the column check-
ing the items that are "white or good" on the left of the item and items
that are "black or bad" on the right of the item. After permitting
questions, the subjects are told that when they turn the next page,
they will be asked to check white faces or good on the left, and black
faces or bad on the right, completing as many as possible in the allot-
ted time, as the (shorter) sample below indicates:
20. Craig Lambert, Stealthy Attitudes, at www.harvard-magazine.com/on-line/070270.html.
(last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
21. The order of the tasks may slightly alter the strength, but not the direction of the effect.
Brian A. Nosek et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association: Test II. Methodological
Issues, at http://www.briannosek.comlpapers/ngb.IATmethodll.2003.pdf (last visited Jan. 20,
2004)
22. In the practice test, subjects attempt to go through as many items as possible in the time
limit, checking items that are either flowers or good on the left side of the page and either insects
or bad on the right side of the page; then on the next page, the subject is asked to check off items
that are either insects or good on the left and items that are either flowers or bad on the right.
2004] 1543
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Black White
Bad Good
0 0
Black
Bad
had 0
After completing this task, the subjects are asked to turn the page,
and the new pairing of black with good and white with bad is ex-
plained. Subjects then complete the same task with the new pairing,
as the sample below indicates:
Black White
Good Bad
0 \I/mit 0
I' I
Black White
Good Bad
o 0
.00
0 vomlit 0
00 0
0 terriific 0
0 * 0
1 2 " .7 " " - " . .... ... .... . .. .. . . . . . ... .. .... ... . .
The number of items correctly completed on each test is then
counted; it is not the number of items a particular subject can com-
plete that is of significance, but the difference in the number of items
White
Good
0
1544 [Vol. 53:1539
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he or she completes when white is paired with good and black with
bad, as contrasted with the number completed when black is paired
with good and white with bad.
B. The Subjects
Two of the three data sets are the product of presentations made by
one of the authors at training sessions for capital defense lawyers.23
The first was obtained at an annual gathering of lawyers who re-
present death row inmates in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Most of these attorneys are experienced capital litigators, but some
novices were invited. The training session was held in Nashville, Ten-
nessee, but the attorneys came from all over the country. These sub-
jects we will call the "habeas lawyers." The second data set was
collected at a training session for Georgia trial lawyers involved in
representing defendants charged with capital crimes; these subjects we
will call the "trial lawyers." We asked all of these subjects for their
race. For the trial lawyers, we also collected the age and gender of
each subject. The third data set is composed of most of the students in
a first-year constitutional law class at Cornell Law School; we will call
them the "law students." For the law students we collected race, age,
and gender data.
III. RESULTS
As shown in Table 1, on average, the subjects in all three groups
completed more items when white was paired with good and black
with bad than when black was paired with good and white with bad,
and in all three groups these differences are statistically significant.
For example, the table's first row shows that, for all subjects com-
bined, an average of 16.4 correct responses were given when white
was paired with good and black with bad compared to 13.5 correct
responses when black was paired with good and white with bad. A
test of the statistical significance of the difference in means, computed
using a t-test, yields a p-value of less than 0.0001 for our 321 subjects,
as reported in column (4). The difference in means is significant at
that level for each group as well as for all groups combined.
23. The primary purpose in administering all of these tests was educational, and after the tests
were administered, the subjects were asked to compare the number of items they were able to
complete in the time period, and then the interpretation of the test suggested by the authors was
presented. In all three cases, substantial discussion followed.
2004] 1545
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TABLE 1. NUMBER OF ITEMS COMPLETED WHEN "GOOD" Is
PAIRED WITH WHITE FACES V. WHEN "GOOD" Is PAIRED
WITH BLACK FACES, BY SUBJECT GROUP
Average Number of
Correct Responses When Difference = Significance of
"Good" is Paired with: (1) - (2) Difference N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Black
Faces Faces Means Medians
All subjects 16.4 13.5 2.8 <.0001 <.0001 321
Habeas lawyers 14.4 12.1 2.3 <.0001 <.0001 146
Trial lawyers 16.7 13.6 3.0 <.0001 <.0001 92
Law students 19.5 15.9 3.6 <.0001 <.0001 83
To eliminate the possibility that the significance of the difference is
the product of a few extreme individuals and to assure that the results
are not sensitive to the distributive assumptions associated with the t-
test, we also tested the statistical significance of the differences in me-
dian correct scores. Column (5) shows that the median differences are
also significant beyond the 0.0001 level for all groups and for the
groups aggregated into a single sample. Thus, the probability of ob-
serving by chance differences as large as, or larger than, those ob-
served is vanishingly small.
As shown in the Table 5 regression models reported below, differ-
ences between the three groups-habeas lawyers, trial lawyers, and
law students-are not statistically significant. Within each group,
however, the differences between black and white subjects are highly
significant. Table 2 expands on Table 1 by reporting the results bro-
ken down by race within each subject group. Table 2 shows that, for
all groups combined, as well as for each subject group, the average
white subject completed more items when white was paired with good
than when black was paired with good, while the average black 24 sub-
ject completed more items when black was paired with good. For ex-
ample, for all white subjects combined, an average of 16.6 correct
responses were given when white was paired with good and black with
bad compared to 13.2 correct responses when black was paired with
good and white with bad. In contrast, for all black subjects combined,
an average of 14.4 correct responses were given when white was
paired with good and black with bad compared to 15.8 correct re-
sponses when black was paired with good and white with bad.
24. We do not refer to our subjects as "African American" because, although virtually all of
the black subjects in the two lawyer groups were African American, in the constitutional law
class, Caribbean and African students are a significant part of the total.
1546 [Vol. 53:1539
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Column (3) of Table 2, which is the difference in correct responses
between columns (1) and (2), shows that this racial difference persists
for all three groups. White subjects in all these groups provided more
correct responses when white was paired with good. Black subjects in
all three groups provided more correct responses when black was
paired with good. For the most part, we limited our analysis to white
and black subjects because the subjects in the two lawyer groups were
almost exclusively black and white. In the constitutional law class,
however, there were fourteen Asian25 subjects, enough to make analy-
sis of their results potentially meaningful. We found that the Asian
subjects were not significantly different than the white subjects, but
were significantly different than the black subjects.
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES WHEN "GOOD" Is
PAIRED WITH WHITE FACES V. WHEN "GOOD" IS PAIRED WITH
BLACK FACES, BY RACE OF SUBJECTS
Average Number of
Correct Responses When Difference = Significance of
"Good" is Paired with: (1) - (2) Difference N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Black
Faces Faces Means Medians
All subjects 16.4 13.5 2.8 <.0001 <.0001 321
Whites 16.6 13.2 3.4 <.0001 <.0001 281
Blacks 14.4 15.8 -1.4 .097 .039 40
Habeas lawyers 14.4 12.1 2.3 <.0001 <.0001 146
Whites 14.5 12.0 2.4 <.0001 <.0001 140
Blacks 12.7 14.0 -1.3 .669 .399 6
Trial lawyers 16.7 13.6 3.0 <.0001 <.0001 92
Whites 17.4 13.1 4.3 <.0001 <.0001 70
Blacks 14.4 15.5 -1.1 .112 .086 22
Law Students 19.5 15.9 3.6 <.0001 <.0001 83
Whites 20.2 15.6 4.5 <.0001 <.0001 71
Blacks 15.4 17.3 -1.8 .384 .432 12
Columns (4) and (5) show that, for all groups of white subjects, the
differences in the numbers of correct responses between white being
paired with good and black being paired with good are highly statisti-
cally significant. In part because of the smaller number of black sub-
jects in each group, and in part because the mean difference in their
white/good and black/good scores is smaller, differences in black sub-
jects' performance on the white/good pairing as compared to the
25. The constitutional law class comprised both United States citizens and nationals of other
countries, and each racial group included foreign students. To determine whether the Asian (as
opposed to Asian-American) subjects might be driving these results, we removed them from the
analysis, but the results were unchanged.
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black/good pairing are not statistically significant for the three sub-
groups considered separately. When the three groups are combined,
however, the differences in the median numbers of correct responses
for black subjects between white being paired with good and black
being paired with good are statistically significant at the .039 level, and
the means differ at the .097 level.
Thus, both white and black subjects score higher when their own
racial group is paired with good. But Table 2 indicates that the differ-
ence is not of the same magnitude. Table 3 explores this difference by
reorganizing some of the data in Table 2. Table 3 again shows that
both black and white subjects on average scored higher when their
own racial group was paired with good than when it was paired with
bad. In all three groups, white subjects' scores were more affected by
which race was paired with good than were the scores of black sub-
jects. Column (3) reports these differences in differences for each
subject group.
TABLE 3. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUMBER OF ITEMS COMPLETED
WHEN "GOOD" Is PAIRED WITH OWN-RACE FACES V. WHEN
"GOOD" Is PAIRED WITH OTHER-RACE FACES, BY SUBJECT GROUP
Mean Difference Between
Number of Correct
Responses When "Good" is
Paired with Subject's Own
Race v. When "Good" is Difference = Significance of
Paired with Other Race (1) - (2) Difference N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whites Blacks Means Medians
All subjects 3.4 1.4 2.1 .008 .018 321
Habeas lawyers 2.4 1.3 1.1 .548 .839 146
Trial lawyers 4.3 1.1 3.2 .0003 .001 92
Law Students 4.5 1.8 2.7 .130 .123 83
Columns (4) and (5) show that, for the groups combined (as well as
for the trial lawyers taken individually), the differences in differences
are statistically significant. For the two other groups, the direction of
the effect is the same but the effect is not statistically significant at
traditional levels, a result likely attributable to the small number of
black subjects. The races' different reaction also emerges in another
measure. Only a quarter of white subjects scored the same or better
on the black/good pairing as on the white/good pairing, while almost
half of the black subjects scored the same or better on the white/good
pairing as on the black/good pairing.
We also examined the effect of gender on the performance, holding
race constant. Table 4 below reports the results. (Its sample is
[Vol. 53:15391548
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smaller than the samples in the other tables because we did not record
the gender of the subjects for the first group we sampled, the habeas
lawyers.) Table 4 can be used to explore two separable questions.
First, do the results in Tables 1 and 2 hold when the sample is disag-
gregated by gender? That is, do males and females separately confirm
the pattern of more correct responses when white faces are paired
with "good" than when black faces are paired with "good?" Second,
Table 4 explores whether the pattern of responses varies not only by
race, as suggested in Tables 2 and 3, but also by gender.
Table 4 shows that the core result of significantly different reactions
to white/good pairings and black/good pairings holds for black males,
white females, and white males. However, for white females and
males the significant advantage is in white/good pairings, while for
black males, the significant advantage is in black/good pairings. For
black females, the tendency is toward easier black/good pairings, but
the difference, as reported in columns (3) through (5), is not statisti-
cally significant.
Column (6) explores whether the difference in differences varies
statistically significantly across the race/gender groups. White women
(as well as black women and black men) are significantly different
from white men. For both blacks and whites, the tendency is for men
to reflect a greater own-race advantage than women, but for black
subjects, the difference is smaller and not significant.
TABLE 4. NUMBER OF ITEMS CORRECTLY COMPLETED WHEN
"GOOD" IS PAIRED WITH WHITE FACES V. WHEN "GOOD" Is
PAIRED WITH BLACK FACES, BY RACE AND GENDER
Average Number of Significance of
Correct Responses When Difference = Difference (1)-(2) From
"Good" is Paired with: (1) - (2) White Males' Difference N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
White Black
Faces Faces Means Medians
Black females 15.0 16.1 -1.1 .365 .397 .002 22
Black males 14.3 16.1 -1.8 .020 .025 .010 12
White females 18.1 15.1 2.9 .0001 .0002 .041 55
White males 18.6 13.8 4.8 <.0001 <.0001 100
Note. Column (6), which shows the level significance of difference from white males,
reports a test of the difference in the median number of good characteristics correctly
associated with one's own race and the other race. A t-test of the difference in means is
also statistically significant.
The analysis so far explores subject group differences and race/gen-
der differences in isolation from one another. To assess all factors
simultaneously, we employ regression analysis and report the results
2004] 1549
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in Table 5 and include age in the models for those subjects for whom
age is known. Models reported in columns (1) and (2) explore the
differences described in Tables (1) and (2)-the difference between
subjects' scores when whites are paired with good characteristics and
when blacks are paired with good characteristics. We report both or-
dinary least squares models and negative binomial models. Negative
binomial models are appropriate because the dependent variables in
our models are count data-the difference in the number of correct
responses. 26 Columns (3) and (4) report models that explore the dif-
ference in differences between the white/good and black/good scores.
It thus assesses whether the explanatory variables in the model help
explain the degree of within-race favoritism.
TABLE 5. REGRESSION MODELS OF DIFFERENCES IN SCORES
BETWEEN PAIRINGS
(1) (2)
Dependent variable = Difference
between subject's white/good and
black/good scores
OLS
Black female -6.465**
(4.88)
Black male -7.001**
(8.59)
White female -2.035*
(2.51)
White male = reference category
Trial lawyers 0.802
(0.91)
Habeas lawyers -2.437
(1.02)
Law students = reference category
Age -0.620
(1.56)
Age missing -1.613
(0.58)
Gender missing 0.166
(0.12)
Constant 6.278**
(6.43)
Observations 321
R-squared or
pseudo R-squared 0.16
Negative
binomial
-0.344**
(4.30)
-0.381**
(7.99)
-0.098*
(2.50)
0.041
(0.95)
-0.128
(0.98)
-0.031
(1.59)
-0.075
(0.51)
0.014
(0.19)
3.154**
(69.42)
321
.030
(3) (4)
Dependent variable = Difference
between subjects own-race/good
and other-race/good scores
Negative
OLS binomial
-4.272** -0.285**
(3.37) (3.06)
-3.149** -0.206**
(3.50) (3.39)
-2.099* -0.133*
(2.59) (2.54)
0.645
(0.73)
-1.947
(0.81)
-0.835*
(2.12)
-2.794
(0.98)
0.344
(0.25)
6.912**
(7.12)
321
0.10
0.045
(0.78)
-0.136
(0.79)
-0.054*
(2.13)
-0.178
(0.90)
0.035
(0.35)
2.954**
(51.01)
321
.017
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
26. ALAN AGRESTI, CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS 559 (2d ed. 2002). To assure positive val-
ues of the dependent variable in the negative binomial analyses, a positive integer was added to
the values of the dependent variable for all observations. Id.
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Table 5 confirms the results in the earlier tables. Models (1) and (2)
show that black females, black males, and white females all tend to
have less extreme differences between the white/good and black/good
conditions than do white males. The results are all significant at or
beyond the 0.05 level. The results do not depend on the functional
form, least squares, or negative binomial of the models used. The
story is constant across models (1) and (2). Similarly, models (3) and
(4) show that the difference between the number of good characteris-
tics correctly associated with one's own race and the other race is as-
sociated with a race/gender effect. White males again differ
statistically significantly from the other three race/gender combina-
tions. They tend to record greater differences between own-race/good
and other-race/good pairings than do the other race/gender combina-
tions. The result is statistically significant and persists in both least
squares and negative binomial models.
Again, differences between the three subject groups-habeas law-
yers, trial lawyers, and law students-are not significant. The only
surprise is that age, which viewed in isolation was not a significant
predictor of performance, is slightly but significantly correlated, and in
a negative direction, with size of mean white/good and black/good
differences
IV. DISCUSSION
Because speed at these tasks reflects relative ease in associating two
categories of items, the creators of the IAT describe a subject who is
more adept at pairing white with good than black with good as having
an "automatic preference" for white. In adopting this terminology,
we note that "preference" as used here does not imply a conscious
choice, but merely an automatic association; when we say that subjects
have an "automatic preference for white," we mean nothing more
than that they automatically associate white with good and black with
bad.27 Part III of this Article reported both the direction of the auto-
matic associations and their relative strength for each professional
group (habeas lawyers, trial lawyers and law students) and for demo-
graphic subgroups of each group (dividing the groups by race, gender,
27. This preference is not the result of greater familiarity with white faces. Researchers have
eliminated the familiarity hypothesis by using familiar black faces (or names) and unfamiliar
white faces (or names), and find that the automatic preference of whites subjects for white sur-
vives unchanged. See generally Nilanjan Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Ameri-
cans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 316 (2000),
available at http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/DasguptaEtAl.JESP2000.pdf (last visited Apr.
13, 2004).
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and age). Because we used a paper and pencil version of the IAT, we
are unable to compare the strength of observed preferences with those
found in the larger IAT databases,28 but we can compare the direction
of those preferences with those observed in the larger, more diverse
(and overwhelmingly lay) subject pool, as well as relative differences
between the demographic subgroups in each data set. After making
these comparisons, we will turn to the question of what behavioral
implications, if any, these observed automatic preferences entail.
The direction and demographic distribution of the automatic prefer-
ences we observed are strikingly consistent with those observed in the
larger trials not targeted at occupational subgroups. 29 Data from the
websites, like our data, reflect significant automatic preference for
whites among white subjects; this is true when good and bad are in
turn paired with black and white faces, and it is also true when they
are paired with first names that are associated with black or white
persons. 30 Black web subjects, on the other hand, show an automatic
preference for black faces or names, but that preference, like the pref-
erence of our defense lawyer and law student subjects, is weaker than
is white subjects' automatic preference for white faces or names. 31
Our responses and the web responses both mimic earlier laboratory
results with college student subjects.32 Moreover, the web researchers
found, as we find, that Asian respondents show a pro-white bias level
28. We were, however, able to compare the strength of automatic preferences in our law stu-
dent and defense lawyer groups with the strength of the automatic preferences of undergraduates
who attended the Race to Execution Symposium, and found no significant differences. We do
not report the symposium data because it reflects such a hodge-podge of respondents that we
were uncertain as to the meaning of any results, but the undergraduate component of the sympo-
sium was large enough to analyze, and gives us some reason to believe that our sample does not
differ in strength of the automatic-race preference from lay populations, just as the web data
gives us confidence that the direction of our sample's preferences is indistinguishable from that
of the general population.
29. The IAT has been administered in laboratory settings to college students, but most of the
reported data has been harvested from demonstration web sites. As the authors who report
web-site findings acknowledge, there are selection effects that render these web subjects differ-
ent from a random sample of the population; most obviously, these subjects must have access to
a computer, awareness of the test, and interest in taking the test. (Recruitment occurred through
four known channels: media coverage, links from other sites, search engines, and word of mouth,
with media coverage being the most significant source.) See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting
Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THE-
ORY RES. PRAC. 101, 102-103 (2002), available at http://projectimplicit.net/nosek//papersharvest-
ing.GroupDynamics.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). Nonetheless, the data represents a much
more diverse subject pool than those ordinarily surveyed in psychology experiments, id. at 102,
and one likely to be largely composed of nonlawyers.
30. Id. at 105-06.
31. Id. at 105.
32. Id.
[Vol. 53:15391552
IMPLICIT RACIAL ATTITUDES
comparable to that of white respondents. 33 Finally, while our regres-
sion reflected that white women showed slightly, but significantly less,
negativity toward black faces than did white men, web researchers re-
ported that women subjects (not broken down by race, but predomi-
nantly white) showed slightly less automatic preference for whites. 34
The reader will recall that our results on age were of marginal sig-
nificance in the regression, with older age predicting slightly less of an
automatic preference for white. This is the only place our results dif-
fer even slightly from those of the web research; there, older partici-
pants did not differ at all from younger ones on the analogous face
test. Several explanations for these disparate findings are possible.
While it is possible that our older capital defense attorneys, unlike
their age peers in the general population, actually do harbor weaker
automatic preferences for white than do otherwise similar subjects,
web research on the performance of various measuring algorithms
suggests that our results may be an artifact of our scoring method,
which does not account for the fact that older subjects perform all of
the tasks more slowly.35
Thus, our capital defense attorneys, both trial and post-conviction
(trial lawyers and habeas lawyers), look like our law students in their
implicit attitudes about race and, as far as we can tell, pretty much like
the rest of the population. White men have the strongest automatic
preference for white, followed by white women. The responses of
Asian subjects look like those of white subjects. In contrast, black
subjects have an automatic preference for black, but it is significantly
smaller than the preference white and Asian subjects have for white.
If one imagines that automatic reactions are the combined product of
culture and individual experience, these patterns are not surprising.
Looking at other empirical evidence concerning lawyers, the ob-
served similarities between defense lawyers, law students, and the lay
population are also not surprising. Popular impression to the con-
33. Nosek, supra note 29, at 110. The web data also has a substantial number of Hispanic
respondents, who also show a pattern similar to that of white respondents. Id.
34. Id. at 109.
35. In our scoring, a proportionally equal impairment would result in a smaller absolute dif-
ference score for an older subject; for example, if an older subject completed fifteen items in the
white/good test, but only twelve in the black/good test, while a younger subject completed
twenty items on the white/good pairing, but only sixteen on the black/good pairing, the older
subject, by our measurement, would have a weaker preference for white. In contrast, web re-
searchers have developed a more complicated algorithm for measuring automatic preference,
one that includes calibration by each respondent's latency variability. Anthony G. Greenwald et
al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test:. L An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. COGNITION 197, 214 (2003). That algorithm is not transferable to the
paper and pencil test, so we could not benefit from its development.
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trary, comparisons between judges and juries generally find little dif-
ference in the damages they award.36 And, most relevantly, judges
appear to be just as susceptible as are jurors to three cognitive illu-
sions that hinder accurate decision making: anchoring, hindsight bias,
and egocentric bias.37 Finally, judges' political orientation has been
shown to have some influence in politically charged cases. 38 As is
slowly being recognized across the field, "lawyers are like other peo-
ple and suffer from the same human failings as those not admitted to
the bar."'39 Though we have presented evidence that white capital de-
fense lawyers, like the rest of the population, have automatic reactions
that make associating white with good easier than associating white
with bad, we have by no means proved that they treat black clients (or
witnesses, jurors, attorneys, or judges for that matter) differently than
they treat their white counterparts. Indeed, even the evidence on the
relationship between explicit prejudice and discrimination is complex.
Subjects who acknowledge negative attitudes toward vulnerable
groups do not always discriminate against them; either lack of oppor-
tunity or social disapproval may inhibit the expression of those atti-
tudes.40 Likewise, subjects who disavow negative attitudes toward a
vulnerable group may nonetheless discriminate against that group for
a variety of reasons, including social pressure to do so and covert or
unconscious stereotypes about the target group.41 Because measure-
ment of implicit racial attitudes is quite new, even less is known about
how those attitudes affect behavior.
It is, however, possible to note what external factors are known to
make discrimination more likely and consider their presence or ab-
36. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002) (finding no substantial difference in the rates judges and
juries award punitive damages and no substantial difference in the relation between the size of
punitive and compensatory damages for judges and juries); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, As-
sessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with
Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REv. 883, 896 (1993); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking
About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751,
812 (1999).
37. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816 (2001). Judges
also fall prey to framing effects and the representative heuristic, though they are less susceptible
than others.
38. Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV.
1717 (1997).
39. Fred C. Zacharias, The Humanization of Lawyers, 2002 PROF. LAW. 9, 10 (arguing that this
is one of the significant transformations in professional responsibility scholarship in recent
years).
40. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 56-57 (1954).
41. The sharp differences between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes found by web re-
searchers attests to the frequency of unconscious (or covert) negative attitudes. See, e.g., Nosek
et al., supra note 29, at 111.
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sence in the context of capital representation of a minority-race defen-
dant. As already mentioned, social approval (or even the absence of
social disapproval) enhances the likelihood of discrimination. The
factor of social approval must vary widely in capital representation,
depending in part on whether the relevant audience is the local prose-
cutor (with whom the next case must be plea-bargained), the local
judge (who may be the source of the next appointment as counsel),
the local defense bar (whose attitudes differ by area), the jurors (who
in some small localities are potential clients), or the national capital
defense bar. Stereotypes are more likely to alter judgement when a
task is complex, 42 or a decision difficult,43 or when the context acti-
vates stereotypes.44 Certainly the task of representing a capital defen-
dant or habeas petitioner is complex and involves many difficult
decisions. Moreover, the capital litigation context-in which the de-
fendant is accused of heinous crimes-seems especially likely to acti-
vate stereotypes of violence and criminality.
There is some evidence that awareness of automatic reactions can
trigger attempts to counteract them, and that such attempts are some-
times successful.45 Here we have no clear indication of whether capi-
tal defense attorneys struggle against their own automatic reactions.
On the one hand, we would predict from their ideological commit-
ments that they would be inclined to do so, if they were aware that they
had such reactions; on the other hand, anecdotal experience in ad-
ministering these tests leads us to believe that many capital defense
attorneys were surprised at their own automatic preferences and,
42. ALLPORT, supra note 40, at 56-57.
43. Thus, for example, mock jury studies of race and guilt attribution find race-of-defendant
effects in the "marginal evidence" cases; when proof of guilt is either weak or strong, these
effects do not appear. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1611, 1626-34 (1985) (reviewing the literature). The same pattern is reflected in the Baldus
data on capital cases in Georgia; race-of-victim effects are found in the cases that are in the
middle range of aggravating factors. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 364 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., HOWARD EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 40 (1973). See also
Patricia Linville & Edward E. Jones, Polarized Appraisals of Outgroup Members, 38 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 689 (1980). IAT research reveals that automatic race evaluations are
significantly stronger when the black exemplars were disliked than when they were liked. Jason
P. Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
455, 460 (2003).
45. Annie Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The Truth About Stereotypes, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
May-June 1998, at 52 (quoting researcher Margo Monteith). However, attempts to suppress
stereotypes may also sometimes backfire, causing them to return in a stronger form. Id.
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therefore, would not have previously realized that they should strug-
gle against those preferences. 46
IV. CONCLUSION: WHO IS POLICING THE BIAS POLICE?
Our initial foray into the racial attitudes of capital defense lawyers
permits us a modest conclusion: Like the rest of the population, race
influences their automatic reactions. This proves neither that race
does, nor that it does not, often influence the quality of representation
afforded the black clients of these attorneys. For judges reviewing the
effectiveness of the assistance of counsel provided to capital defend-
ants, our data suggest that they should not assume that race has not
influenced the actions of defense counsel, and that they should not
assume that counsel will be sensitive to the racial bias of other crimi-
nal justice system actors. For the capital defense lawyers themselves,
it suggests that introspection about racial stereotypes and reactions, as
well as vigilance concerning those effects on others, is necessary. For
the public, it may be yet another reason to doubt the evenhandedness
of capital punishment.
46. It is clear that the process of "de-automatization" works only for people disturbed by the
discrepancy between their conscious and unconscious beliefs. Id. Creation of awareness of the
discrepancy, in both the lawyers and the law students, was the primary purpose of administering
the IAT to these groups.
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